When Peace Can No Longer Be Taken for Granted
By Mika Horelli –
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s speech in December 2024 was a stark reminder to Europeans that the world has changed. His statement that Europe is not in a time of peace, even if it is not at war, reflects a sobering reality that demands action. This is not just a political or military matter but one that extends to everyday security, economic resilience, and societal preparedness.
Historically, Europe has often paid a steep price for being unprepared. I am too young to remember the horrors of the Second World War, and most of those who lived through it have already passed away. My grandparents, born in the late 1800s and early 1900s, could not imagine the outbreak of the First World War. They grew up during a long, relatively peaceful period when Europe firmly believed in the permanence of peace. When war finally came, it shattered not only the infrastructure of European nations but also their people’s belief in a secure future.
The period leading up to the Second World War bore similar hallmarks: many European countries hoped that appeasement and diplomacy could prevent conflict. The Munich Agreement of 1938, for example, promised peace but, in reality, merely postponed the start of the war. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark were swiftly invaded by Germany in 1940, unprepared for the threats of modern warfare. These nations’ experiences demonstrate that believing a conflict will remain distant can lead to grave miscalculations with repercussions that echo through generations.
Rutte’s speech recalls these moments in history. Now, as then, Europe is often reluctant to fully grasp the scale of the threats it faces. The forms of hybrid warfare may not be as visible as traditional armed conflicts, but their impacts can be equally, if not more, devastating. Our economic and societal systems are more complex and, therefore, more vulnerable than ever before.
But what does this mean for ordinary citizens? What should Europe do, and how does this manifest in Belgium, Finland, or elsewhere? It is clear that hybrid warfare—cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and sabotage targeting critical infrastructure—will become increasingly common. At the same time, traditional military threats remain real for countries geographically closer to Russia or other unstable regions.
The perspectives of Belgium and Finland differ due to geography, historical experience, and current threat assessments. Finland, given its proximity to Russia, prepares for tangible risks. The country has long invested in a comprehensive security model, integrating the state, businesses, and citizens into a shared framework of readiness. This is evident in the widespread availability of bomb shelters, the operations of the National Emergency Supply Agency, and the continuous development of cybersecurity capabilities.
Belgium, on the other hand, has historically functioned as an international hub due to its central location, but the country’s preparedness for attacks on its energy infrastructure has raised concerns. The Netherlands and Luxembourg, two other small Western European nations, are also reassessing their levels of preparedness. The Netherlands, as one of Europe’s largest port economies, is particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks and disruptions to logistics networks. Luxembourg, known for its financial stability and banking hub status, has started to recognize that its critical services, such as financial systems, could become attractive targets for hybrid attacks.
The frontlines of hybrid warfare are everywhere. In Belgium, a key risk lies in energy and logistics disruptions. Ports like Antwerp are critical not only for Europe’s economy but also for its security. A cyberattack or operational disruption at these ports would have far-reaching consequences across the continent. Meanwhile, Belgium, like many other Western European countries, has been slow to improve civil defense and supply chain resilience. The pandemic and the war in Ukraine have exposed the vulnerabilities of Europe’s welfare states during crises, prompting a renewed focus on security matters.
In Finland, hybrid warfare preparedness emphasizes cybersecurity and countering information influence operations. Public initiatives like the “72-hour survival kit” concept have garnered attention across Europe. In daily life, this means Finns are openly encouraged to prepare for crises, understand emergency communication, and maintain basic supplies. Finland has also tested its ability to manage large-scale power outages, and local authorities are prepared for supply disruptions lasting months.
Despite these efforts, vulnerabilities remain in Finland and across Europe. Critical infrastructure, particularly energy and telecommunications networks, often lacks resilience. Finland benefits from strong ties with Nordic and Baltic neighbors, but its reliance on energy imports and global supply chains remains a risk.
In Belgium and Western Europe more broadly, public awareness of hybrid warfare threats is lower than in Eastern and Northern Europe. This may partly stem from a perception that security risks are distant, even though cyberattacks and infrastructure disruptions affect everyone. Rising energy costs and uncertainty over gas supplies are tangible reminders of how dependent we are on stable international relations.
In light of Rutte’s speech, it is clear that the coming years require action at both local and EU levels. First, cybersecurity must be improved across Europe. This means investing in technology and expertise. Belgium has established cybersecurity centers, but their resources lag behind needs. The Netherlands and Luxembourg face similar challenges—cybersecurity infrastructure exists, but political will and funding have fallen short of actual requirements.
Second, supply chain resilience must be strengthened. This includes supporting local food production, increasing energy self-sufficiency, and safeguarding critical supply chains. In Belgium, this could take the form of investments in renewable energy or public education on preparing for extended power outages. Finland is already advanced in this work, but the challenge remains to ensure contingency plans effectively reach all citizens.
Third, combating disinformation has become a central priority. The effects of disinformation campaigns are visible across Europe. Russia-backed efforts aim to erode public trust in governments and shared institutions. This is particularly relevant in Belgium and the Netherlands, where political polarization has increased. Finland has invested in media literacy and critical thinking education, but much work remains, especially in reaching older populations.
Finally, it is vital to understand that security is a shared responsibility. Mark Rutte’s warning is realistic, but it should not provoke fear—it should inspire action. Every European nation is now part of a broader security community where one country’s weakness is everyone’s weakness. This means Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland, and other European nations can learn from one another and work together to achieve more.
While daily life continues, the world is not the same. By acting proactively, we can ensure that we live as safely as possible in the years to come. Rutte’s words were not merely a warning—they were a call to responsibility. And this responsibility lies with all of us.
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